Russia is waging hybrid warfare in Europe
„Russia is waging a low-intensity war against Europe, primarily Poland and the Baltic region, through a coordinated campaign of cyberattacks, sabotage, cable damage, and GPS jamming.”
Counter-narrative
Some attributions rely on press and anonymous intelligence sources, as well as warnings, not on official evidence. The NATO Secretary General calls for calm, and European actors do not fear a direct NATO attack.
Voices
Polish government and CERT Polska, ESET, German and Danish governments, NATO and EU leaders, The Telegraph, UNITED24 Media
Analysis
The narrative links cyber and physical incidents into a single strategic campaign. It is fueled by attacks on Polish energy and water utilities, Baltic cable incidents, GPS jamming, and sabotage cases in Germany, Romania, and Estonia. Frontline-state governments and NATO have a stake in it, because the narrative mobilizes resources and attention. Its weakness is excessive linkage. Not every case has a named attacker: in the Polish water utility case the excerpts name no one. In other cases, only pro-Russian or Russia-friendly groups are suspected. Intelligence warnings and exclusive reports are also difficult to verify.
What's at stake: The stake is the operability of Central and Eastern European critical infrastructure in a prolonged, sub-threshold conflict.
Narrative sub-threads
Cyberattacks on energy and water systems
Actors linked to Russia are attacking Polish and Nordic energy, thermal, and water systems. ESET attributes the DynoWiper attack affecting more than 30 Polish wind and solar power plants to the Sandworm group. The Danish government named Russia behind an attack on a water utility, while Sweden said pro-Russian hackers attempted to breach a thermal power plant. Reports say a turbine was also shut down at a second Polish thermal power plant, but the sources received do not attribute this attack to anyone.
This sector relies on digital intrusions and affects industrial control systems and utilities. Attribution is provided by research firms and governments, though the attacker remains unnamed in several incidents, including the five Polish waterworks and the turbine shutdown case.
↗ rising · evidence: strongPhysical sabotage with recruited agents
Russia is organizing physical sabotage against railway lines, substations, arms factories and defence-industry targets using recruited, disposable agents. According to a Polish warning of May 6, 2026, it is shifting from cheap recruits to professional sabotage cells.
This is not about code, but about explosions, arson, and track sabotage. Evidence comes from Polish indictments and Romanian prosecutorial findings, supplemented by intelligence claims and press reports.
→ lasting · evidence: moderateUndersea cables and GPS jamming
Cable damage and intensifying GPS jamming in the Baltic Sea region threaten shipping and air traffic. Finland blames Russia for the jamming, Lithuania published a map of false GPS signals, and Poland reported a drastic rise in GNSS interference.
This strand concerns maritime and navigation infrastructure, with coastal states and NATO as carriers. The evidence is mixed: a ship was seized and then released, and the Latvian investigation found no link. However, a Finnish court imprisoned a Russian captain, and crew members of two cargo ships were also convicted.
▲ at peak · evidence: moderateOfficial warnings and European countermeasures
EU, NATO, German, French and Polish leaders, as well as US intelligence, increasingly call the campaign a Russian hybrid war. Germany summoned the Russian ambassador, the EU Council sanctioned nine individuals and four organisations, and Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski warned of the growing risk of fatalities. Meanwhile, the NATO Secretary-General called for calm, and no direct attack is expected.
This strand concerns political and diplomatic framing. Evidence comes from leadership statements, intelligence warnings, an ambassador's summoning, and sanctions decisions, not individual incidents.
Sub-thread stories
Cyberattacks on energy and water systems
Physical sabotage with recruited agents
Undersea cables and GPS jamming
Official warnings and European countermeasures
Who is affected and how
- security leader
- Model the Russian state actor as a baseline threat for organizations in the energy, water, and defense industries. Audit the OT network and private APN connections separately.
- security operations
- Based on CISA's Polish lessons, OT and ICS environment security gaps must be reviewed first.
- public-sector decision-maker
- A coordination mechanism is needed to jointly handle cyber and physical sabotage. According to European officials, the campaign partly aims to tie up investigative capacity.
- journalist and researcher
- Separate official attribution from anonymous intelligence sources. Verify whether the cases indeed belong to the specific year and actor.
Hungary
The Hungarian press reports on Polish cases: the railway sabotage, energy attacks and their Sandworm attribution, CISA lessons, the water utility intrusion, and the second thermal power plant attack. It also reports on the Romanian sabotage network, the Estonian border closure, and the US intelligence warning. Hungarian papers presented the Swedish thermal power plant incident as a Russian cyberattack, whereas the Swedish statement referred to pro-Russian hackers. There is no trace of direct involvement in Hungary in the stories examined.
Weekly trend
Turning points
Supporting stories
Machine analysis based on story titles and summaries, with a verification pass. The source of the facts is the article linked at each story.
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